Service authentication

Every backend service runs with its own service identity. When one service calls another, it presents a service JWT that identifies the caller. When the call chain started from a logged-in user, user context can travel alongside service identity on downstream requests.

Receiving services validate tokens on every call and can restrict sensitive operations to named callers.

This guide is for architecture review, procurement, and security diligence.

What problem this solves

Internal network location is not proof of trust. In a microservice deployment:

Any compromised task could call any endpoint if only IP rules protected APIs.
Background jobs (scheduled tasks, async processing) need identity without a human session.
Sensitive operations (audit ingest, admin actions) should accept calls only from known services.

Backbone treats service identity as a first-class JWT trust domain, separate from user tokens.

What's in place

Capability	Description
Dedicated service accounts	One Cognito service-pool identity per ECS backend service
Credential storage	Per-service secrets in AWS Secrets Manager, provisioned and rotated by infrastructure
Automatic token lifecycle	Services acquire, cache, and refresh service JWTs without manual intervention
Caller allowlists	Sensitive endpoints accept only named callers (e.g. audit ingest limited to auth and notification services)
Dual context propagation	User-initiated chains carry both service and user identity; system-initiated chains carry service identity only

How internal calls work

  actor-bff (user request)
        │
        │  service JWT + user JWT
        ▼
  auth-service
        │
        │  service JWT (+ user context when applicable)
        ▼
  actor-service / notification-service / …
        │
        ▼
  Receiver validates JWT, checks caller allowlist

User-initiated flows through the BFF present both identities on downstream calls. Scheduled tasks and system flows present service identity only.

Bootstrap endpoints (login, registration, token refresh) do not forward identity — credential exchange stays separate from authenticated call chains.

Zero-trust alignment

Verify explicitly — Protected service endpoints require a valid JWT; service-only routes reject user-only tokens.
Least privilege — Caller allowlists name the only services permitted for sensitive operations.
Assume breach — Stolen user credentials alone cannot satisfy service-only endpoints; service credentials are a separate trust domain.

Transport between services uses HTTP on the internal load balancer by default, with application-layer JWT validation. Optional internal HTTPS is an Enterprise-tier platform configuration option.

Relationship to user authentication

Identity type	Used for	Issued by
User JWT	End-user API access	Cognito actor user pool
Service JWT	Service-to-service calls	Cognito service pool

These are separate trust domains. See User authentication for the human identity model.

Operator expectations

Topic	Expectation
Deploy	Service accounts and secrets are created automatically when runtime stacks deploy
Rotation	Infrastructure manages password rotation for service pool credentials
New services	Adding a deployable ECS service includes provisioning its service account
Future hardening	mTLS and service mesh identity are optional enhancements beyond the baseline